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Abstract: The global financial crisis of 2008 has stimulated the debate on corporate 
governance and shareholder protection. The intuitive reason for the topicality of share-
holder protection is that insolvencies mainly harm shareholders as the companies’ re-
sidual claimants. In addition, ideally, shareholder empowerment may ensure better mon-
itoring of management and therefore better-run companies preventing corporate failures 
and benefiting the economy as a whole. Yet, it is not self-evident that shareholder par-
ticipation has such a positive effect. This paper critically examines the discussion about 
the relationship between the financial crisis, shareholder protection and law reform. We 
also develop a central position: while there may be a need to improve shareholder pro-
tection, we do not take the view that any increase in shareholder rights is the right way 
forward; rather, such reforms should aim to encourage shareholder engagement by re-
sponsible long-term investors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the world economy seemed to be relatively founded on 
a secure platform, and even at the beginning of the crisis few anticipated its destructive 
effects.1 Now, however, policy debates have been mushrooming, for instance, on mat-
ters of bank bail-outs, international financial regulation, economic stimulus and austeri-
ty, but also corporate governance and shareholder protection.2 Regulators are struggling 
to place business operations on a more secure basis. Yet, the question remains whether 
improving corporate governance and shareholder protection are the right answer. In the 
context of the recent financial crisis and shareholder protection, views are diverse in 
regard to whether to blame or exonerate corporate governance.3 
Our examination reveals the issues to be more complex than hitherto understood. 
The intuitive reason for the topicality of shareholder protection is that increases in in-
solvencies harm shareholders as the companies’ residual claimants. In addition, ideally, 
shareholder empowerment may ensure better monitoring of management and therefore 
better-run companies benefitting the economy as a whole. Yet, it is not self-evident that 
the crisis actually calls for improvements of shareholder protection. For instance, one 
can make the point that shareholders of public companies are often only interested in 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., B.R Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? 
The Case of the S&P 500’ (2009) 65 Business Lawyer 1, at 4 (‘Too few regulators, stock market analysts, 
and journalists … foresaw the havoc that would follow if and when it burst.’). 
2
 For the general discussion on regulation and the financial crisis see, e.g., S. Konzelmann and M. Fo-
vargue-Davies (eds.), Banking Systems in the Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism (2013); E. Avgou-
leas, Governance of Global Financial Markets (2012); J. Gray and O. Akseli (eds.), Financial Regulation 
in Crisis?: The Role of Law and the Failure of Northern Rock (2011). 
3
 Similar J. Armour and W.-G. Ringe, ‘European company law 1999-2010: renaissance and crisis’ (2011) 
48 Common Market Law Review 125, at 169 (no consensus whether existing corporate governance is 
deficient or simply poorly implemented). 
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short-term benefits, and that such short-termism was precisely what contributed to the 
financial crisis.4 
Specifically, we are interested in the relationship between shareholder protection and 
the financial crisis in the context of EU corporate governance. Taking the current law as 
a starting point it is difficult to say that the EU has ‘failed’ to align corporate govern-
ance with shareholder protection. On the one hand, the EU did address shareholder pro-
tection in the past, sometimes directly – namely in the Shareholder Rights Directive5 – 
sometimes indirectly in other directives and regulations.6 On the other hand, the ques-
tion is whether these rules have really provided shareholders with a strong voice in the 
corporate governance of public companies.7 Moreover, many topics of shareholder pro-
tection have not been harmonised, for example, the enforcement of directors’ duties or 
the rights of minority shareholders. Thus, assuming the need for better shareholder pro-
tection, more harmonisation could be needed. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section explores the differing views on 
whether the financial crisis shows failures of corporate governance – or whether its 
main reasons lie elsewhere. The second one critically discusses the claims that, after the 
crisis, shareholder empowerment should be strengthened. Third, we look at issues of 
shareholder participation in corporate governance, and examine investor culture in light 
of the financial crisis. This forms the basis for our central position, namely, that law re-
forms should aim to encourage shareholder engagement by responsible long-term inves-
tors. For this purpose, this section also provides specific suggestions on how such ‘bet-
ter engagement’ may be achieved. Fourth, assuming there is a need to improve share-
holder protection, we discuss the right form and level of legal reform, ranging from self-
regulation to national, European and international initiatives. The final section con-
cludes. 
 
 
THE CRISIS: EVIDENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES? 
 
A number of reasons have been suggested on why the financial crisis occurred.8 These 
views include those who argue that corporate governance failed in the crisis, in particu-
lar as regards the protection of shareholders. Others take the view that the 2008 finan-
cial crisis was not a verdict on corporate governance. We outline these differing posi-
tions before reaching the conclusion that it is difficult to decisively exonerate or blame 
corporate governance for the 2008 financial crisis. 
                                                 
4
 For details see the discussion in the following sections. 
5
 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of 
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. 
6
 Notably through the harmonisation of securities law in terms of disclosure and transparency. See, e.g., 
Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements (…). For a useful overview 
see European Parliament - Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Rights and obligations of shareholders – 
National regimes and proposed instruments at EU level for improving legal efficiency’, PE 462.463 (May 
2012), pp. 21-36. 
7
 P.E. Masouros, ‘Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously?: An Essay on the Importance of 
Shareholdership in Corporate Europe’ (2010) 7 European Company Law 195, at 196. 
8
 See generally, e.g., the literature cited op. cit., n. 2. 
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Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami9 observe that in the run-up to the banking cri-
sis of 2007-2008 boards and regulators in the UK did not adequately protect sharehold-
ers. They argue that in the banking sector much decision-making was left to CEOs who 
undertook excessive risks without restraint from the boards and regulators. Internal reg-
ulation within corporations and corporate networks needs to be backed by networked 
regulation as well as by effective external regulatory mechanism which imposes some 
sanction for failure. But the problem was that regulators took a ritualistic approach to 
regulating corporations, and ‘government regulators seemed to have the role of provid-
ing reassurance to market actors rather than effectively sanctioning them.’10 
Observing the plight of shareholders, Tomasic and Akinbami note that shareholders 
have traditionally simply voted with their feet and sold their shares, but even that did 
not seem to affect boards.11 For shareholders to engage with the boards effectively, they 
argue that companies need to provide more information to shareholders to allow them to 
act effectively. They observe that under the principle of director primacy, the responsi-
bility to manage and limit risk rests with the boards and CEOs. In that regard, share-
holders have much less capacity to influence decision-making, and it does not help that 
the courts have buttressed this under the so-called business judgment rule to support 
board primacy. Thus, Tomasic and Akinbami call for boards to spend more time on 
company matters, and for board members to be required to have greater banking related 
expertise.12 
A similar focus on boards has been taken by the UK’s Treasury Committee of the 
House of Commons.13 It identified three problems with corporate governance in light of 
the financial crisis: (a) lack of time many non-executives devote to their role, (b) too 
many non-executive directors within the banks lack relevant banking or financial expe-
rience, and (c) banks drawing upon too narrow a talent pool when appointing non-
executive directors to the detriment of diversity of views. With respect to shareholder 
empowerment, all of this can be read to imply that making shareholders appoint better 
directors would be an important step in the right direction. 
In the literature it has been suggested that the EU should increase shareholder protec-
tion in order to restore trust in capital markets.14 The EU institutions seem to follow this 
suggestion. The European Commission published a Green Paper in April 2011,15 and 
                                                 
9
 R. Tomasic and F. Akinbami, ‘Towards a New Corporate Governance After the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2011) International Company and Commercial Law Review 237. See also R. Tomasic and F. Akinbami, 
‘The Role of Trust in Maintaining the Resilience of Financial Markets’ (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 369. 
10
 Id., p. 242. 
11
 Id., p. 248. 
12
 Id., p. 249. 
13
 Treasury Committee, House of Commons (HC 416), Banking Crisis: Dealing with the failure of the UK 
banks (2009) 10-11.  
14
 Masouros, op. cit., n. 6, p. 203. 
15
 European Commission, ‘Green Paper: The EU corporate governance framework’, COM(2011)164 
final. 
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submitted an Action Plan in December 2012.16 Inter alia, the plan suggests that there 
may be changes to the Shareholder Rights Directive17 in the coming years. 
But the question on ‘what went wrong’ has also triggered a different response. For 
example, according to John Coffee, ‘the 2008 financial crisis stands above all as testi-
mony to the error of excessive reliance on broad principles and self-regulation.’18 He 
relates this specifically to the regulatory system in the EU and how it applies to US 
companies. The EU adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC, the 
main thrust of which was to require regulatory supervision at the parent company level 
of financial institutions. Yet, major US financial institutions lobbied the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for a system of ‘functional equivalent’ regulation to satis-
fy the EU Directive. This procedure allowed US banks to generate their own risk mod-
els, which the banks quickly turned into a process of self-regulation. It also allowed the 
banks to opt for a relaxed ‘alternative net capital rule’ instead of the traditional capital 
adequacy rule that placed a maximum ceiling on debt to equity ratio. What followed, 
Coffee explains, was a reckless expansion by the US investment banks, characterised by 
relaxed due diligence standards to compete for the markets, taking on a greater risk in 
real estate investment with undiversified exposure to a downturn in the market. When 
the liquidity from risky acquisitions of sub-prime mortgages hit the market, investment 
banks were hit the hardest, and this had a negative knock-on effect on the rest of the fi-
nancial institutions in the global market associated with US banks.  
As one reads the analysis by Coffee, as to what went wrong, the implication seems to 
be that it had nothing to do with corporate governance failure. If there is apportioning of 
blame, it lies with regulation of securities in the financial market. But even then, it is 
difficult to say that securities regulation failed to protect shareholders, for shareholders 
were fully supportive and involved in the seemingly irresponsible practices of financial 
institutions that led to the 2008 financial crisis. For example, in reviewing the histories 
of failed UK companies, the Kay Review found that that many of the bad decisions 
leading to the failures were supported or even encouraged by a majority of the share-
holders.19 To fully blame securities regulators for what went wrong would be to assign a 
very paternalistic responsibility to regulators to protect shareholders from themselves. 
In a similar vein, Brian Cheffins takes the view that corporate governance did not fail 
in the 2008 financial crisis.20 He reaches this conclusion by a detailed examination of 
corporate governance practices in the thirty-seven companies that were removed from 
                                                 
16
 Communication from the Commission, ‘Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance 
- a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies’, COM(2012) 740 
final. 
17
 Op. cit., n. 5. 
18
 J.C. Coffee, ‘What went wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 
9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, at 22. 
19
 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, Final Report (July 2012), 
para. 1.28. The general findings of this review were endorsed by the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS), Ensuring Equity Markets Support Long-Term Growth, The Government Response to the 
Kay Review, November 2012; House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, The Kay 
Review of UK Equity Markets and Long–Term Decision Making, Third Report of Session 2013–14, HC 
603, July 2013. 
20
 Cheffins, op. cit., n. 1. A similar study of US firms is R.B. Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial 
Crisis’ (2012) 12 International Review of Finance 7. 
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the iconic S&P 500 index of publicly traded companies during the stock market turmoil 
of 2008. In these companies, Cheffins found that in various key respects corporate gov-
ernance operated satisfactorily. Corporate failures that occurred were largely fraud-free; 
boards of directors generally performed satisfactorily enough to avoid public criticism; 
and in troubled companies the directors were far from complacent, as they orchestrated 
CEO turnover at a rate greatly exceeding the norm in publicly traded firms. In conclu-
sion, Cheffins observes that events occurring during 2008 do not provide a convincing 
case for radical initiatives.21 Based on these findings, he also cautions that lawmakers 
would be unwise to treat the stock market turmoil of 2008 as a justification for sweep-
ing corporate governance reforms.22 
These divergent views demonstrate the difficulties of exonerating or blaming corpo-
rate governance for the recent financial crisis. A possible explanation is that the relevant 
causes are not independent of each other: for example, if one considers the risks of 
speculative financial instruments, one interpretation may refer just to the existence of 
these instruments while another one may say that deficiencies in corporate governance 
allowed managers to make use of them. Moreover, a possible reason for these ambigui-
ties is that considering the relevance of corporate governance as a whole is too abstract. 
Thus, there may well be lessons to be learnt for more specific topics of company law. It 
is a question of what lessons and whether that should lead to a stronger empowerment 
of shareholders, to which examination we turn to next. 
 
 
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT: STATUS QUO AND WAY FORWARD 
 
The traditional role of shareholders in corporate governance, mainly reduced to voting 
on company matters in a general meeting, may explain the difficulty shareholders find 
in playing an effective role in averting corporate failures. Whereas shareholders may 
vote in the general meeting on issues that shape the company, the power to manage the 
company is reserved for the board of directors.23 If directors manage the company in a 
manner that causes financial loss, shareholders may be able to file a derivative claim.24 
But they may also want to intervene earlier: combining a monitoring and disciplinary 
role, they could aim to remove incompetent directors from office.  
Yet, this is not always straight-forward. In German law, the management board can 
only be dismissed by the supervisory board in the event of an important reason, which is 
presumed if the general meeting withdraws its confidence, and dismissal of supervisory 
board members is only possible by three quarters of the votes cast, unless an important 
reason is present.25 In the UK, Section 168 of the Companies Act empowers sharehold-
ers to appoint and remove directors from office at any time. However, for a director 
                                                 
21
 Id., p. 61. 
22
 Id., p. 4. 
23
 For a comparative overview see M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (2008) 152-3. 
Specifically for the UK see Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v. Caddies [1955] 1 W.L.R. 352; 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v. Cuninghame [1902] 2 Ch. 34; Percival v Wright 
[1902] 2 Ch. 421 (directors do not, in general, owe fiduciary duty to shareholders). 
24
 Siems, op. cit., n. 23, pp. 212-8 (comparative overview). 
25
 See §§ 84(3), 103(1),(3) German Companies Act (Aktiengesetz). 
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with a service contract, even where there has been clear wrongdoing by the director, the 
company may prefer to pay the director to go quietly, rather than insist on dismissing 
him without notice.26 A director with a service contract may also be entitled to compen-
sation for dismissal.27 The political necessity to keep the director reasonably well dis-
posed towards the company, if he or she is the only one to be removed and is aware of 
wrongdoings by other directors, may prove an impediment to his removal.28 In compa-
nies with limited number of shareholders, where the company’s articles provides for 
voting arrangements in favour of a director/member being removed,29 removal would be 
difficult.30 The practical remedy may well lie in shareholders simply selling their shares 
and investing elsewhere. This inevitably reduces the role of shareholders to that of mon-
itoring market price index for an exit strategy. 
In light of the financial crisis, does the answer lie in law reform for greater share-
holder empowerment, for instance introducing binding votes on executive remuneration 
policy, as recently proposed by the European Commission?31 William Bratton and Mi-
chael Wachter have little sympathy with greater shareholder empowerment as a part of 
regulatory response to the financial crisis.32 To them, shareholder empowerment would 
make it much more difficult for a good board of directors to resist pressures to manage 
to the market. Moreover, incentive-compatible executive compensation and shareholder 
empowerment are seen as inconsistent goals. They argue that if executive compensation 
can be fixed by requiring longer holding periods, it is then turned around and unfixed if 
managers are encouraged to manage the market as a response to shareholder empower-
ment.33 
Similar views have been expressed by other academics. Alan Dignam argues that 
shareholder empowerment as a reform mistakenly characterise shareholders as willing 
and responsible owners when in the recent bank failures it was shareholders’ activism 
that was a significant problem.34  According to Lynn Stout the ‘mantra’ that directors 
are obliged to maximise shareholder value leads to ‘reckless, sociopathic and socially 
irresponsible behaviours’, which not only harm the corporation and the public but also 
                                                 
26
 P.L. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn., 
2012) 415. 
27
 Section 168(5)(a) CA 2006. 
28
 J. Lowry and A. Reisberg, Pettet’s Company Law (3rd edn., 2009) 180. 
29
 See Bushell v. Faith [1970] A.C. 1099. 
30
 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn., 2012) 227. 
31
 European Commission, op. cit., n. 16, p. 9. This is in line with recent reforms in the UK and the US: 
see Section 439A CA 2006, inserted by, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24; Section 951 
US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173). But see 
also C.M. Bruner, ‘Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis’ (2011) 36 Journal of Corporate 
Law 309 (for differences in shareholder orientation between the US and the UK as they relate to recent 
reforms).    
32
 W. Bratton and M. Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 158 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 653. 
33
 Id., p. 690. 
34
 A. Dignam, ‘The future of shareholder democracy in the shadow of the financial crisis’ (2013) 36 
Seattle University Law Review 639, at 688. 
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individual investors;35 Andrew Keay too blames managerial short-terminsm which is 
seen as a consequence of shareholder pressure and the emphasis on quarterly earnings;36 
and Simon Deakin considered the reasons for excessive risk-taking, namely, the ‘in-
creasing alignment of managerial interests with those of shareholders, through corporate 
governance innovations such as share options and independent boards’.37 
Newspaper articles have expressed similar views. According to a column in the Ob-
server,38 regardless of theory, ‘a system that encourages the same organisation to pay 
one person 470 times what another gets will eventually blow up’. But the column does 
not suggest that therefore incentives should be more closely aligned to shareholders. 
Rather, the opposite: this trend need to be reversed as the management’s first accounta-
bility should be to those who have the greatest power to create or destroy shareholder 
value – employees, customers and suppliers.39 
This relates to the general question of what is meant by corporate governance, in par-
ticular in the context of the recent financial crisis. We take the view that corporate gov-
ernance needs to address ‘the basic legal characteristics of the business corporation.’40 
Yet, the tendency has been to concentrate entirely on the protection of shareholders. 
Corporate governance has been ‘increasingly perceived in a narrow sense, that is, per-
taining solely to the internal and external control mechanisms between shareholders and 
managers.’41 This has led to the managers concentrating on the share/stock market price 
as a mechanism of aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests in order to reduce 
agency costs. Inadvertently, this has given managers to adopt much risk-taking – and 
major parties in corporate governance have acquiesced into this trend.  
It is however difficult to blame the cause of the financial crisis on corporate govern-
ance, even when perceived in its narrow sense. The causes seem to be of risk manage-
ment, which is a question of judgement for directors, and not per se, a question of 
shareholders’ role in corporate governance. While in its 2009 report, the Organisation 
                                                 
35
 L.A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (2012). See also L.A. Stout, ‘New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”’ 
(2012) Accounting, Economics, and Law, vol. 2, iss. 2, article 4 
36
 A. Keay, ‘Risk, shareholder pressure and short-termism in financial institutions: does enlightened 
shareholder value offer a panacea?’ (2011) 5 Law and Financial Markets Review 435. 
37
 S. Deakin, ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability 
in the Business’ Enterprise’ (2012) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 339. See also S. Deakin, ‘Corporate 
governance and financial crisis in the long run’, in The Embedded Firm, Cynthia A. Williams and Peer 
Zumbansen eds. (2011), pp. 30-40. 
38
 For the following see S. Caulkin, ‘It’s time to explode the myth of the shareholder’, The Observer, 9 
March 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/29/corporate-governance-
moneyinvestments>. Similar W. Hutton, ‘We need a revolution in how our companies are owned and 
run’, The Observer, 29 September 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/30/will-
hutton-new-model-capitalism>. 
39
 The ‘shareholder-stakeholder debate’ is also a frequent topic of the academic literature. See, e.g., A. 
Keay, The Corporate Objective. Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (2011); M. Siems, ‘The Rank-
ing of Shareholder and Stakeholder Interests in Common and Civil Law Countries’, in Company Law and 
CSR: New Legal and Economic Challenges , Ivan Tchotourian ed. (2013), forthcoming. 
40
 J. Armour et al., ‘What is Corporate Law?’, in R Kraakman et al. (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn., 2009) 1. 
41
 L. Horn, ‘Corporate Governance in Crisis? The Politics of EU Corporate Governance Regulation’ 
(2012) 18 European Law Journal 83, at 94. 
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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concluded that ‘the financial cri-
sis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate gov-
ernance arrangements’,42 this conclusion also needs to be understood from the back-
ground of an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance that is predominantly share-
holder oriented. This model concentrates on private aspects of corporate governance, 
which focuses on internal control mechanisms of aligning interests between sharehold-
ers and managers. It places public aspects of corporate governance at the periphery – 
such that ‘public intervention in corporate governance system is only tolerated where it 
serves to ease market failures.’43 But it is difficult to see how far simply giving more 
powers to shareholders could have averted the financial crisis. Yet, this should not be 
seen as our final word since we also need to examine shareholder engagement in light of 
possible changes to investor cultures. 
 
 
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND INVESTOR CULTURES 
 
1. Short-term versus long-term investment 
 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, investor culture had shifted from long term to short 
term orientation.44 Subsequently, this has often been seen as a problem. For example, in 
the Green Paper on Corporate Governance the European Commission found ‘evidence 
that the majority of shareholders are passive and are often only focused on short-term 
profits’,45 and a subsequent Green Paper specifically dealt with the aim of long-term 
financing of the European economy.46 Thus, the problem is that corporate governance 
with its emphasis on shareholder value has enhanced investor pressure for greater re-
turns on short-term investment, and that such short-term investors hardly engage with 
corporate governance for a greater sustainability.47 For instance, in takeover situations, 
shareholders often have a short-term focus, as they may have purchased the shares after 
the bid has been announced in order to make a quick gain, should the takeover succeed, 
with no interest in the future of the company once they have accepted the offer and exit-
                                                 
42
 G. Kirkpatrick (ed.), The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Financial Market 
Trends, OECD 2009) 2. 
43
 Horn, op. cit., n. 41, p. 86. 
44
 For details see P.E. Masouros, Corporate Law and Economic Stagnation: How Shareholder Value and 
Short-Termism Contribute to the Decline of the Western Economies (2013) (identifying the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods monetary order in the early 1970s as the main trigger). 
45
 European Commission, op. cit., n. 15, p. 3. 
46
 European Commission, Green Paper: Long-Term Financing of the European Economy, 25 March, 
2013, COM(2013) 150 final. See also the 2010 consultation on a ‘Long-Term Focus for Corporate 
Britain’ by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-long-term-focus-for-corporate-britain-a-call-for-
evidence>, which preceded the Kay Review (see op. cit., n. 19). 
47
 This does not imply that long-term shareholders cannot also ‘benefit from managers destroying 
economic value’,  J. M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders’, ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 200 (2013), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227080>. 
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ed the company.48 It also seems fair to assume that since the financial crisis this short-
term investor culture has not changed: most shareholders of large public companies on-
ly hold their shares to maximise their financial return.49  
On the lack of shareholder engagement, the European Commission observed that ‘it 
is primarily long-term investors who have an interest in engagement.’50 We believe the 
backdrop to this lack of shareholder engagement is the fact that investors who largely 
contribute to corporate liquidity tend to be short-term investors. Boards of financial 
firms striving to keep solvent and therefore in need of liquidity, pushed by stock market 
price index performance measures, are likely to have little choice but to focus on short-
term demands of short-term liquidity providers. Long-term corporation growth is often 
left to non-financial institutions since ‘money growth’ and not corporation growth 
seems the trend in financial institutions. 
In addition, the problem is more complex than merely lack of shareholder engage-
ment. In its 2010 report, the OECD found that in both widely held companies and those 
with more concentrated ownership shareholders were ineffective in monitoring the 
boards, ‘neglecting the effect of excessive risk taking policies.’51 The problem can be 
traced from the gap between the capital provider and the corporation control, leading to 
a focus by shareholders on stock market price index to measure board performance. 
This led to shareholders acquiescing to the practice of short-termism by directors as 
they seek to meet the ostensible appetite of investors for higher and immediate returns. 
Should the law intervene to reverse this trend and foster a better monitoring and en-
gagement shareholder culture? 
On the need for better monitoring of corporate governance, the European Commis-
sion is of the view that regulatory authorities should not ‘interfere with the content of 
the information disclosed or make business judgements on the solution chosen by the 
company.’52 On the one hand, the law seems handicapped here. On the other hand, it 
should not seek to ensure no corporate failures. In other words, the law should not, and 
cannot, insist on success.53 Indeed, the OECD observes ‘that effective risk management 
is not about eliminating risk-taking, which is a fundamental driving force in business 
and entrepreneurship’ but rather about ensuring ‘that risks are understood, managed 
and, when appropriate, communicated.’54 
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2. Dispersed shareholder structures in particular 
 
For countries such as the UK and the US, the dispersion of shareholder ownership in 
most public companies55 further makes it difficult for shareholders to engage in corpo-
rate governance. In dispersed ownership companies, say where each shareholder holds 
one per cent of the shares, shareholders tend to have little economic incentive to engage 
in corporate governance let alone seek to discipline directors. In such structures, share-
holders do not have the time and the means to investigate directors’ incompetence or 
excessive risk-taking. If the shareholders have shares in, say, 80 listed companies hold-
ing one per cent shares in each, they are only concerned with the share value on the 
stock market, and if the other company’s shares are not doing well, they tend to simply 
sell the shares and invest somewhere else.56 
The disciplining of directors in dispersed ownership companies also tends to be left 
to the market forces – where the assumption is that competitiveness in the market would 
force management to converge on good and reasonable management, thereby increasing 
share value. The assumption here being that directors will very much avoid the lowering 
of share prices, as low share price on the market makes the company vulnerable to a 
hostile takeover bid, which, if successful, will usually result in the dismissal of the di-
rectors. The financial crisis has revealed weaknesses in these economic assumptions as 
managing to the stock market prices seems to have increased the appetite of excessive 
risk-taking. 
Where, as a result of lack of shareholders’ engagement, directors take excessive 
risks, causing loss to shareholders, English company law usually does not provide rem-
edies. In fact, in the context of crises, company law may, especially takeover law, wors-
en the problem. Company law’s response to such problem has often been to give an exit 
strategy to an aggrieved shareholder – a mechanism of selling shares at a fair price.57 
The most commonly applied relief for aggrieved shareholders is for the court to grant an 
order that ‘the petitioners’ shares be purchased by the controllers or the company’, 
which ‘gives the petitioner an opportunity to exit from the company with the fair value 
of his or her investment’.58 This exit strategy is strengthened by takeover law;59 yet, the 
exit strategy in takeovers neither increases shareholder engagement nor disciplines di-
rectors, for ‘while takeovers might serve an industrial restructuring purpose, they serve 
no function in disciplining management’.60 
For years before the 2008 financial crisis, the markets have fostered an increase of 
short-term focused investors, as these have contributed to the much-needed liquidity. 
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The problem is when those who manage companies fail to know where to draw the line 
between attracting liquidity and placing business on a sustainable platform. But what 
choice do managers have if even the traditionally long-term institutional investors give 
their mandates through market pressure for greater short-term returns? In dispersed 
ownership companies, the problem is worse: short-term investors tend to ‘invest in 
thousands of companies, with small stakes in any individual company – it is impossible 
for any investor to truly understand all these investments.’61 Accordingly, the focus 
tends to be on short-term gains without engagement. We therefore observe the well-
known problem that for such shareholders ‘exit’ is just too easily available in order to 
make any effort for ‘voice’62 a worthwhile endeavour. 
 
3. Institutional shareholders and engagement 
 
The lack of shareholder engagement is exacerbated by the fact that today institutional 
investors often outsource their investment decisions to external asset managers.63 These 
asset managers tend to focus on short-term gains based on market price index, and are 
usually not interested in engagement with corporate governance. In the words of Jaap 
Winter, these asset managers, if ‘pushed by regulation and codes that require or expect 
such engagement they will at best engage at what I call a compliance level: engaging 
because and to the extent they have to.’64 Should the answer be more regulation? Or 
should investor culture change? To pursue the former is to paternalistically seek to pro-
tect investors, yet the latter is difficult to pursue by legal intervention. Still, there is need 
for a paradigm shift in investor cultures. Whether this paradigm shift should come via 
legal regulation or via self-regulation by the markets is the question. According to Win-
ter: 
 
‘A key challenge of regulation, in general, but certainly in response to a crisis, is 
to distinguish which problems can be meaningfully addressed by new regulation 
and which problems cannot. A bigger challenge still is to act on this distinction 
and to have the courage not to regulate the latter problems but to seek different 
avenues of addressing them. Such avenues would typically involve challenging 
and exposing the world views, beliefs, myths and assumptions underlying the 
current ways of being and acting.’65 
 
Whether we seek new regulation to influence a paradigm shift, it seems that the EU fi-
nancial law has often not been helpful in increasing shareholder engagement. Pension 
and insurance investments have to invest in accordance with the ‘prudent person’ rule, 
and this entail that assets being properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive 
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reliance on any particular undertakings and accumulations of risk in the portfolio as a 
whole.66 Thus, the aim is to avert risk-taking by encouraging diversification. However, 
the result of diversification of portfolio is ‘an investment policy that is not focused on 
an actual understanding of individual companies, but on more or less following the 
market.’67 This hardly encourages engagement. 
The culture remains that most institutional shareholders are interested in returns on 
investment, which is monitored via the market-share price index, without the need of 
engagement in internal governance of the company. But for meaningful shareholder en-
gagement, this will require a shift in the investment culture. In the light of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, investors may need to take John Maynard Keynes seriously: 
 
‘As time goes on I get more and more convinced that the right method in in-
vestment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows 
something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is 
a mistake to think that one limits one's risks by spreading too much between en-
terprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confi-
dence’.68 
 
Thus, there is need to revert to a culture that focuses on long-term sustainability of 
companies rather than short-term value gains. Lessons could be gained from the tradi-
tional German corporate governance model, which is sustained historically by a notion 
of long-term commitment between the company and its various stakeholders – with its 
tenets of not focusing on making money per se, but on product quality and innovation, 
by which it was able to evade price competition and sustain investment-high growth 
levels.69 But this model does not exist in its pure form any more. Especially in the fi-
nancial sector, a number of global factors have altered the traditional German corporate 
governance model, making companies more susceptible to hostile takeovers and norms 
such as shareholder value.70 
 
4. Sovereign Wealth Funds and shareholder activists 
 
In addition we need to consider the changing composition of investors. Brenda Hanni-
gan argues that ‘enthusiasm for shareholder engagement may be misplaced or at least 
may be based on unrealistic expectations’.71 The context of this caution relates well to 
the increasing Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) investors with declining domestic inves-
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tors. A 2012 survey shows a decline of domestic investor shareholding with an increase 
of foreign investment between 1981 and 2012.72 Insurance funds holdings declined 
from 20.5% to 6.2% and pension funds from 26.7% to 4.7%, with foreign holdings at 
53.2% in 2012.73 SWF investments are usually treated with high levels of mistrust and 
suspicion, especially if these SWF are from governmental regimes and legal systems not 
leant on democratic principles or not assuming market fundamental liberties.74 Most of 
these SWFs are from emerging economies. The call for measures that would avoid po-
tential negative consequences of investments by SWFs is heard louder and louder in the 
West.75 Hannigan observes that encouraging engagement by those types of investors is 
more challenging, not least because they are less susceptible to domestic political pres-
sures to engage.76 
Beyond SWFs, there has been a growing literature on the possible detrimental effects 
of activist shareholders. Critics have said that the real problem is now that ‘meddling 
and second-guessing from shareholders’ makes it hard for managers to do their jobs ef-
fectively.77 There may therefore be the need to ‘protect the autonomy of management’ 
in corporate governance.78 Yet, one should also not exaggerate the risks of shareholder 
activism. Following Iris Chiu,79 it seems plausible to distinguish: while there is no 
denying that some activist hedge funds may harm companies, other activist shareholders 
may have a more positive effect. Thus, for example, it is an open question of whether 
activist shareholders should owe fiduciary duties to the company, as we would need 
more empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of such shareholder activism. 
 
5. Where do we go from here? 
 
In this section we have seen that the question of shareholder engagement and investor 
culture remains a challenge. In the UK, where shareholding in listed companies is most-
ly dispersed, the market does not encourage shareholder engagement in corporate gov-
ernance. The structure and regulation of equity markets today overwhelmingly empha-
sise ‘exit’ over ‘voice’ and this has often led to shareholder engagement of superficial 
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character and low quality. But even with more concentrated shareholdings and stronger 
employee participation, like in Germany, global factors have long changed investor cul-
ture making engagement difficult. Thus, the suggestion to shift towards more compa-
nies with family and employee ownership80 is unlikely to be a solution to all problems 
of corporate governance. 
Yet, more generally, the financial crisis of 2008 may initiate a paradigm shift away 
from a short-term investment culture towards effective long-term investment and share-
holder engagement. Legal reforms can well play a supporting role. These reforms may 
increase the protection of shareholders – while it also needs to be considered that just 
giving shareholders more powers would be unsatisfactory since shareholders may also 
abuse such an enhanced governance role.  
In detail, it is suggested that the following measures can be useful tools to encourage 
long-term value creation. First, legal rules can explicitly reward long-term shareholders. 
A possible model is the provision of the French Commercial Code on ‘loyalty divi-
dends’, namely that the articles ‘may allot an increase in dividends, with a ceiling of 
10%, to any shareholder who can show a registered contribution of at least two years’ 
duration’.81 The EU Green Paper on Long-Term Financing also considers such incen-
tive structures.82 
Second, following a similar logic, the recent literature has suggested to modify the 
strength of voting rights according to the duration shares have been held,83 or even to 
impose a minimum period in which shares cannot be sold.84 The first of these sugges-
tions could also be used to stimulate entrepreneurship, but this would be different for 
the second one: thus, it is also clear that encouraging long-term shareholder ownership 
is not and should not be the only aim that company law should pursue. 
Third, beyond these direct tools, various other rules of company law play a role. For 
example, it is frequently suggested that remuneration structures should be designed as to 
reward long-term performance, say, by way of distributing shares to directors that they 
have to hold until retirement from their post.85 Another prominent example is disclosure 
and transparency: here it is increasingly understood that a balance has to be found since, 
on the one hand, corporate disclosure fosters accountability, but, on the other, excessive 
reporting requirements foster short-termism.86 
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SELF-REGULATION, NATIONAL, EUROPEAN OR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The previous section concluded with a number of suggestions on how to improve cor-
porate governance. But if these are only taken up in one country, the apparent risk is 
that international investments would just move elsewhere. Thus, the question is how 
and by whom those and other regulatory responses can or should be implemented. 
Self-regulation in UK company law started in the early 1990s following a number of 
business scandals. Today corporate governance codes are common in many countries.87 
These codes usually follow the UK model of the Combined Code in requiring compa-
nies to give a statement showing how far they comply with the code (‘comply or ex-
plain’). Their potential advantages are said to lie in their liberality, flexibility and effec-
tiveness: if self-regulation works, there is no need to have recourse to the harsher and 
less flexible means of statute law. It may also be particularly effective regulation be-
cause corporate governance codes are usually developed by groups that have special 
professionality and expert knowledge.88  
In the post-crisis world there are, however, also reasons to be cautious. Generally 
speaking, self-regulatory tools can be seen as a form of deregulation since companies 
are given more flexibility. Yet, a lesson to be drawn from the financial crisis is that just 
leaving everything to market forces may have devastating effects. More specifically, 
corporate governance codes are based on the idea that shareholders are able to properly 
assess whether and how companies comply with the codes. But, considering the crisis, 
this seems a bit naïve since shareholders did not stop excessive managerial risk-taking. 
Moreover, self-regulation can lead to one-sided rules since short-term interests may take 
preference over the interests of long-term shareholder as well as employees, consumers 
and the general public.  
But it is also possible that self-regulation can specifically target the lack of responsi-
ble shareholder engagement. In the UK, the Walker Review observed that in the run-up 
to the financial crisis, board and director shortcomings would have been tackled more 
effectively had there been more vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors 
acting as owners.89 This led to the Stewardship Code,90 which – similar to the Com-
bined Code – is voluntary but asset managers are required to report whether or not they 
apply the Code. One of its core principles is that institutional investors should monitor 
their investee companies. In the responses to the EU Green Paper on corporate govern-
ance some suggest that this model may be extended to the entire EU.91 Given the inter-
nationalisation of institutional investments, it seems logical to have a code that is not 
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limited to a particular country. Yet, it may also be worth waiting for empirical evidence 
showing whether the Stewardship Code has a positive effect in practice, not only for 
investors but also in terms of public accountability.92 
The general question whether we need more European harmonisation in shareholder 
law has to start with an assessment of the status quo. The Shareholder Rights Di-
rective93 has only harmonised some aspects of the law, and even there Member States 
have retained a significant degree of discretion. Other elements of EU company law on-
ly indirectly relate to shareholder protection, for instance, if one assumes that rules on 
capital maintenance94 may not only serve the interests of creditors but also minority 
shareholders. More extensive harmonisation can be found in EU securities regulation, 
for instance, on prospectuses, transparency, market abuse and investment services.95 
But, these rules are not specifically aimed at the protection of shareholders, since they 
typically also protect other investors, such as bondholders, or deal with the functioning 
of financial markets more generally.96 
Should the EU get more closely involved in the harmonisation of core company law, 
for instance, provide uniform rights to minority shareholders throughout the EU?97 In 
general, uniform laws have a number of benefits, such as creating a ‘level playing field’, 
reducing transaction costs and providing legal certainty for cross-border businesses.98 
However, it can also be questioned whether such harmonisation is necessary – or even 
useful. As one of us has shown, in company law legal systems come closer together 
even without formal harmonisation;99 and as far as such convergence has its limits, the-
se can actually be seen as advantageous, for instance, enabling some experimentation 
and accommodating different shareholder ownership structures.100 
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But when we turn to more specific measures, the assessment may be more positive. 
The EU Green Paper asks whether the EU should facilitate shareholder cooperation, for 
instance, by way of web based platforms and networks.101 This is directly relevant in the 
current context. In the previous sections we explained that shareholders are often not 
interested in the long term development of their company since they feel that their indi-
vidual votes would not make a difference. Thus, measures that can address this collec-
tive action problem would be useful, though they may not necessarily require formal 
EU legislation.  
Another lesson from the crisis is that relying on national or regional responses is not 
sufficient. As stated by the European Commission: ‘the crisis is global and calls for an 
international response’.102 To start with, this requires taking stock of the extent to which 
topics of shareholder protection and corporate governance have been addressed at the 
international level. The main source are the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
which provide, for instance, minimum standards on shareholder rights and equal treat-
ment of shareholders.103 Yet, these are drafted in very general terms; thus, the OECD 
Principles mainly confirm what most developed countries of the world already provide 
in their company laws.104 Moreover, the OECD Principles are not formally binding. The 
same is the case for other international documents related to corporate governance, such 
as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises105 and the various recommenda-
tions by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).106 
Despite the crisis, it cannot be expected that the international community will be able 
to agree on a common approach to shareholder protection. Yet, a number of current ini-
tiatives aim to provide improved forms of regulation and supervision of international 
financial institutions and markets.107 Concerns of financial stability have been on the 
agenda of the recent summits of the G20 in London, Pittsburgh, Toronto and Seoul. For 
example, at the London summit it was agreed to establish a Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) in order to monitor the global financial system. With respect to financial institu-
tions, reference needs to be made to the ‘Basel III’ framework of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision: this will increase capital adequacy requirements of banks; in 
addition, the Basel Committee has adopted Principles for Enhancing Corporate Govern-
ance, for instance, specifying obligations for risk management and internal control.108 
                                                 
101
 See European Commission, op. cit., n. 91, p. 14. See also the innovative proposal by E. Micheler, ‘Fa-
cilitating Investor Engagement and Stewardship’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 
29. 
102
 European Commission, ‘Restoring the Health and Stability of the EU Financial Sector’, 2012, p 6, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/20120206_restoring_health_en.pdf>. 
103
 Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf>. 
104
 But see also M. Siems and O. Alvarez-Macotela, ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Governance?’, in Networked Governance, 
Transnational Business and the Law, Mark Fenwick et al. eds. (2014), forthcoming. 
105
 Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf>. 
106
 See <http://www.iosco.org/>. 
107
 See, e.g., the discussion in C.R. Kelly and C. Sungjoon, ‘Promises and Perils of New Global Govern-
ance: A Case of the G20’ (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 491. 
108
 Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, October 2010, 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.htm>.  
 19
These initiatives show that, as far as corporate governance is concerned, it is specifi-
cally the financial sector that may need to be addressed. As Jaap Winter explains, the 
corporate culture of this sector is precisely what contributed to the crisis: 
 
‘A corporate culture of aggressive pursuit of profits with a win-at-all-cost men-
tality is prone to higher risk-taking and to being arrogant about the risks that are 
being run. The financial industry seems to have been captured by this culture 
more than any other business sector, fuelled by substantial and in a number of 
cases excessive personal gains that could be made by the key players in the in-
dustry.’.109 
 
This line of reasoning is also reflected in statements of the EU Green Paper on corporate 
governance,110 which builds on another Green Paper which explicitly dealt with the cor-
porate governance in financial institutions.111 In the ‘Basel’ and EU documents on the 
corporate governance of financial institutions the core emphasis is not on strengthening 
shareholder rights. Thus, as is the position in this paper, while shareholders play a role, 
increasing shareholder protection is not seen as a panacea to prevent another crisis. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The global financial crisis that started in 2008 has stimulated the debate on corporate 
governance and shareholder protection. This paper critically examined the discussion 
about the financial crisis, shareholder protection and law reform. We started with the 
question of what has caused the financial crisis, the answer being that it is not clear that 
corporate governance was one of the key determinants. This was followed by the ques-
tion of whether post-crisis shareholder empowerment should be on the agenda; again, 
we could only give a cautiously positive reply. Then, we analysed how investor cultures 
shape the engagement of shareholders. Drawing lessons from the crisis, we took the 
view that one should encourage shareholder engagement by responsible long-term in-
vestors, and we provided specific examples on how this may be achieved. Finally, we 
discussed who should implement such a position. We gave the pragmatic response that a 
mix of self-regulation, national legislation and EU and international hard and soft law 
may be a feasible way forward. 
Thus, to address the question posed in the title of this paper, simply telling the EU to 
improve shareholder protection would not be a satisfactory response. First, EU legisla-
tion is not necessarily the best tool: changing investor cultures is not primarily a legal 
question; self-regulation may play some role; and international initiatives may be more 
relevant than a regional response. Second, we do not take the view that any increase in 
shareholder rights is the way forward. The lesson learned is that the law should encour-
age shareholder engagement by responsible long-term investors, thus avoid excessive 
risk-taking and short-termism. 
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The EU Green Paper indicated that ‘taking into account the diversity of situations, it 
does not seem possible to propose a “one size fits all” risk management model for all 
types of companies’.112 This is a statement we also endorse. Since the behaviour of fi-
nancial institutions lies at the heart of the financial crisis, their corporate governance has 
to receive special attention, for instance, requiring an enhanced involvement of share-
holders, financial supervisors and external auditors.113 In particular, in regard to finan-
cial institutions, where taxpayers may be called upon to bailout financial institution and 
for avoidance of systemic failures, robust regulatory approach may be justified. Thus, 
while these details of bank governance and bail-outs go beyond the scope of the current 
paper, they confirm our position that there are no easy answers on how we can prevent a 
repeat of recent events. 
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